It seemed worthwhile to attempt a brief summary of human history from a materialistic point of view, focusing not so much on the emergence of man as on what shaped him through external pressures and led us to where we are today, where the reign of the mind remains that of information and therefore of externality. Sticking to the broad outlines is certainly too simplistic, but it is still better than the even more simplistic mythical accounts that we tell ourselves. Moreover, it shows how we can draw on everything we don't know to refute idealistic beliefs as well as ideological constructs such as Engels' “The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State,” which have no connection with reality.
Prehistory
We were apes for a long time. Chimpanzees and bonobos are still quite close to us, and we have just found carved stones dating back more than 3 million years, i.e. before the first Homo species. Australopithecines had also begun to stand upright and walk on two legs, although they remained arboreal. What would characterize early humans, apart from a more exclusive bipedalism, would not be the invention of carved stones, which allowed them to recover meat from animal carcasses, but rather that their hands adapted to this task, as did their shoulders to throwing stones, which became the first throwing weapon and protected them from predators. We were thus already becoming biologically dependent on our tools. It is difficult to date the moment when sexuality became more important by becoming independent of the reproductive cycle (as in the case of bonobos), which may have come about with the onset of upright walking, when women's sex organs became less visible.
Between 2.5 and 1.6 million years ago, natural selection favored those who lost their hair and began to sweat, enabling them to run long distances in pursuit of game. They became increasingly carnivorous as their brains grew larger and consumed more energy (although meat remained a minority food source and could be replaced by fish). From this early period, we can say that our ancestors occupied the top of the food pyramid. The Homo erectus that resulted from this evolution began to resemble us (there would be quite a few crossbreeds later on), still largely animalistic, although already Homo faber and planning their actions (like chimpanzees or elephants), but with a cranial capacity that developed from 850 cm3 to 1,100 cm3 and increasingly dependent on technology, even a hearth, with some traces dating back more than 1 million years (although the mastery of fire did not really become widespread until around 400,000 years ago). From this point on, we are on the path to Sapiens (who separated from Neanderthals 600,000 years ago), and the practice of cooking can be considered the true foundation of our humanity, a constituent element of culture (contrasting raw and cooked food) along with the manufacture of clothing and tools, all of this undoubtedly predating narrative and symbolic language (but undoubtedly, since the first bifaces, with a fairly evolved gestural and phonetic “language,” already distinct from that of animals, although without grammar). Our physical capacity for articulate language dates back at least 600,000 years.
addendum 2024: recently, the hypothesis has been put forward that a bottleneck decimated (at least locally) our Homo erectus ancestors 930,000 years ago, probably due to climate change with periods of glaciation lasting 100,000 years, reducing our ancestral population to less than 2,000 individuals, with fossils almost disappearing for nearly 100,000 years before a late demographic recovery around 813,000 years ago, This was probably made possible by the mastery of fire and seems to represent a real change in the species, now characterized by cumulative (cultural) progress that widened the gap with other animals and hominids, which became very visible around 600,000 years ago.
The origins of Homo sapiens, which distinguish it from Neanderthals in particular, are not so clear, dated so far to 200,000 years ago (195,000 years for Omo 1 and Omo 2), but some have argued for much earlier dates because there was visible progress in stone tool making 300,000 years ago (and a recent discovery in Morocco confirms a primitive Sapiens at that date, although its brain was not yet like ours). For their part, geneticists trace our origins back to a woman who lived a little over 150,000 years ago in East Africa (Ethiopia?) and only 140,000 years ago for male DNA, but in all likelihood, our ancestors came from South Africa (where genetic diversity is greatest and where the mother tongue is thought to have originated), which does not necessarily indicate an earlier date if “East Africa is a cradle of diversity and evolutionary innovation, while southern Africa is comparable to a museum that preserves diversity over time” (Tyler Faith). The climatic context is that of a European glaciation (Riss) that began in 370,000 after a 40,000-year interglacial period and experienced a relative warming from 220,000 to 190,000 years ago and an end to drought (savannah) in Africa before its return, at the same time as cold weather in Europe (in Africa, depending on the region, periods of glaciation often result in droughts). This was followed by an interglacial period lasting from 130,000 to 115,000 years, during which the Sahara was green, before a new cooling period, with the last glacial period lasting from 110,000 to 13,000 years. However, it remained fairly mild until 70,000 (no doubt with the eruption of the Toba supervolcano 73,000 years ago, which reduced vegetation and decimated populations?), then warmed up from 55,000 to 30,000 years ago (with the Sahara once again becoming humid) to reach the lowest temperatures from 30,000 to 13,000 years ago.
It is no coincidence that the most important visible characteristic of Sapiens is neoteny, which is a form of de-specialization, an unfinished but more flexible being, reinforcing the artificial over the natural, the role of learning, and the time spent on education. This is why we have no immutable essence. This greater adaptability, which detaches us from our immediate environment and makes us an invasive species colonizing all ecosystems, was undoubtedly selected by these multiple and brutal climate changes but requires a more stable social structure and a certain sexual division of labor (which Neanderthals may not have known). The other essential characteristic is, of course, narrative language. Even if, initially, the mother tongue was only dated by linguistic methods to 60,000 years ago, with the first graves dating back a little over 100,000 years (in the Middle East), it is difficult to imagine that there was not already an evolved language at that time, and new genealogical methods date back, as we have seen, to a much earlier date in South Africa. Nevertheless, there was a founding event for our humanity a little over 60,000 years ago with the survivors of the volcanic winter and the main exodus from Africa during a temporary retreat of the glaciers (which would soon block the passage again). Indeed, after a genetic bottleneck that reduced our ancestors to fewer than 15,000 individuals, there was an unprecedented acceleration of technical and cultural progress starting 50,000 years ago, a veritable revolution of the Upper Paleolithic that allowed the small group (already somewhat hybridized with Neanderthals in the Middle East) to spread throughout the world. The most surprising thing about this period is the disappearance of large animals wherever humans arrived (47,000 years ago in Australia), despite their small numbers. This justifies dating our true origin to this relatively recent period (perhaps with the San hunter-gatherers in South Africa), is that our species also underwent accelerated genetic evolution due to selective pressure, which may have been the superiority of weapons, eliminating other populations. Advances in hunting techniques were effectively also advances in weaponry (hardened by fire). This hypothesis is not universally accepted, but what is much more widely accepted is that the superiority of Sapiens, including militarily, came mainly from the fact that they formed larger and more cohesive groups. This required a decrease in testosterone, visible in skeletons dating back 80,000 years (notably the chin specific to Sapiens), but also allowed people to live longer (beyond 30 years), a prerequisite for the development of a more complex culture. The existence of grandparents was essential for the transmission of knowledge, and population growth accelerated the spread of innovations. However, it was not until the warming around 50,000 years ago that these populations became large enough for a symbolic explosion and cultural continuity to occur. This set of specific characteristics (neoteny, enlarged groups, longevity, complex culture) is enough to distinguish us radically from what preceded us (including Neanderthals), without this being seen as self-development but rather as the result of relentless group selection, even though family care reduced individual selection.
The narrative that brings into existence a world we cannot see and allows us to be aware of our existence in a continuity between past and future, a condition of reflexivity, is what fundamentally distinguishes us from animality. Nevertheless, it is not without flaws, feeding all kinds of misleading myths and giving an overly linear representation of the facts. This narrative of origins is itself not immune to this flaw. Of course, things happened in a much more complicated way. There was a branching evolution and other migrations out of Africa that left almost no trace. However, what is important is not the details of evolution but the end result and understanding that we were shaped, along with our technical abilities, by changes in our environment and ruthless selection, which brought us to the brink of extinction several times. Nevertheless, our knowledge is still very fragile and subject to new discoveries (as we have just seen with the discovery of a 300,000-year-old Sapiens), because, surprising as it may seem, nothing changes more than prehistory!
Protohistory
From at least 60,000 years ago, we have been living entirely in a human and spiritual world, a world of hunter-gatherers that has recently disappeared from the face of the Earth and is fairly well known through ethnography, which has revealed its diversity (as well as the diversity of languages). Apart from technology and language, it is very difficult to define what our humanity would be in this multiplicity reflecting differences in environment and history. While there are a few tribes where life seems fairly idyllic, particularly on islands, this is not the majority, with wars between clans being constant, if not ritual, and resulting in many more violent deaths than in our societies. The egalitarianism of these societies also varied greatly, with all kinds of inequalities in status (age, sex, number of women, magical powers) and more or less marked male domination. The dependence of these original societies on nature, which seem less unspoiled than ours, should not lead us to idealize them too much or to ignore their violence.
One of the defining events of this protohistory was the domestication of dogs (at least 35,000 years ago), which marked the complete separation between humans and animals, as well as their proximity. In a way, this was the sign of the growing domestication of humans through culture and education. It also marks the beginning of decorated caves, whose techniques still amaze us today. Everything suggests that we are in a kind of shamanism or animism that continues to this day, albeit in very different forms. We are even able to reconstruct myths dating back to this period, and ancient rituals may still survive in a few places. According to Alain Testart, there was an “explosion of communication using symbols around 38,000/35,000,” followed by the discovery of the harpoon (23,000), needles with eyes (19,000), and the spear thrower (16,000).
With the end of the last ice age 13,000 years ago, followed by a sudden cooling from 12,800 to 11,700 years ago, the greatest rupture since the advent of narrative language occurred: sedentarization and then agriculture. The result was almost a new species. The decisive factor was sedentarisation, which had already occurred several times, particularly in connection with the storage of dried or smoked fish (salmon), both in North America and in the cave villages of the Vézère (near Lascaux), already producing social differentiation (with slaves) and ostentatious spending (potlatch). There had also been scattered agricultural practices before, but our agricultural civilization comes directly from the Near East, and especially from present-day Turkey (or rather Kurdistan), where the abundance of small spelt would have encouraged people to settle down in order to store grain. Sedentarisation is in itself a factor of progress, allowing for the multiplication of possessions and tools (pottery, bows, nets, canoes, etc.) that nomads could not carry with them, but it also reinforces, as we have seen, inequalities and hierarchies (even if there were egalitarian villages in Europe).
The first ceramics and pottery are very ancient but were little used before agriculture became established due to climate change, perhaps initiated by the emergence of a new religion (of human-shaped deities replacing totemic animals), with the temple of Göbekli Tepe (dated 12,000 years ago), whose imposing gatherings would have required a garden (of Eden) to feed all these people (and produce ritual alcoholic beverages)! Curiously, at the moment when agriculture was spreading as a result of poorer climatic conditions, 10,000 years ago, the temple was covered with earth.Sedentarization and storage spaces were a prerequisite for soil cultivation, which became essential once wild grains began to run out, but the invention of agriculture should not be seen as an isolated act, as it is a social organization. “It is not a question of planting a seed, which has always been done, but of gradually establishing an agrarian economy” (Alain Testart).
As the existence of stocks threatened by looting reinforced the warlike dimension (which is too often forgotten), these agricultural societies were therefore built on a functional tripartite division, which is not only Indo-European, combining land work, armed defense, and a common religion (legitimizing power and social organization, with temples also serving as treasuries). With environmental pressure compounded by military (and religious) pressure, this left little autonomy for anyone, but instead reinforced domination (including women). Condemned to do the work of nature (or the gods), we nevertheless moved to a new level in the struggle against entropy and toward our own empowerment, which seems to have since shifted into high gear but, it must be emphasized, only under external pressure. This expulsion from the earthly paradise of hunter-gatherers is not the result of an irrepressible desire or the fulfillment of our supposed inner selves (even if some people do find fulfillment in it). On the contrary, the species emerged transformed (more fragile), standardized (agricultural populations mixed), and genetically adapted to the new diet (notably the digestion of milk).
Since the decline of Marxism, it has been fashionable to claim that the causes of this change in the mode of production are cultural rather than material, on the pretext that, as in Mexico, there is a religion that introduced agriculture in the very beginning. Except that what is decisive is not so much the contingent ideology that originated it here or there (it is not the same religion in both cases). What is decisive is the aftermath that makes it materially indispensable and generalizes it. Once this path had been taken, there was no turning back because, although the food was less rich than that of hunter-gatherers, the population increased tenfold, making it impossible to do without.
We still belong, through all kinds of traces and reminiscences, to this peasant world that has been disappearing for only a few decades, but it is interesting to note that while the early days of agriculture saw a rapid pace of innovation of all kinds, there was much less innovation afterwards, with practices being preserved to the present day.
History
After the long period of deglaciation and rising sea levels, until the warm and rainy climatic optimum (7,500 years ago), the next stage was that of civilization and large cities. There was a kind of “flood” (which flooded at least the plain between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers), which inspired the Sumerians to create the story of Noah, followed by a more arid period. It was then that irrigation became vital and centralized management of canals led to a division of labor and specialization, which was at the origin of many technical advances with decisive inventions such as the potter's wheel, the wheel (for mule carts), and above all, writing. Writing originated in Sumer for trade, while in Egypt it was used to keep track of royal property (in fact, it may have been used for religious purposes first) and in China for oracular inscriptions. The origin depends on the environment, but writing then spread to all areas of life. In any case, thanks to cuneiform tablets, history began in Sumer (although long forgotten), a few centuries before Egypt and the Bronze Age (5,000 years ago), which was an age of wars between city-states and the formation of the first empires. This was also the time when horse domestication spread, allowing trade to expand far and wide and become “globalized.” The Iron Age (3,000 years ago) then ushered in Greek antiquity and the Age of Reason, thanks in particular to phonetic writing, which democratized reading, spread ideas, and created a truly international intellectual scene. Attempts have been made to show that the other material causes of the “Greek miracle” were linked to trade and war between cities. In empires, the situation was quite different, and the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle were soon forgotten in favor of philosophies of happiness and then the religious turning point that followed, with ideologies of empire or slavery (Stoicism, Neoplatonism, Christianity).
The progress of reason is not assured if it does not bring material superiority, and with the Romans, it was once again military power that had the last word. However, the most remarkable thing was the duration of these conquests and their stability, from the Republic to the Empire. Commercial wealth and the Pax Romana came mainly from Roman law, and therefore from progress in reason, which reduced arbitrariness and encouraged trade. For the rest, the Romans were great engineers (aqueducts, fortified camps, catapults, etc.), but they did not experience progress comparable to that of the Greeks, being more tempted by Asian mysteries, astrology, and new religions (Mithraism, Manichaeism, Christianity, Gnosticism). Furthermore, the collapse of the Roman Empire (476), undoubtedly precipitated by poor harvests due to a cooling climate (aggravated in 535), ushered in a long period of regression, barbarian invasions, and a return of local powers, with the loss of so many books and knowledge.
History is not linear (it is not a self-developing process, the expression of a human essence). The context and the urgent issues of the moment take precedence over the past, but after a longer or shorter period of time, technical and scientific progress always ends up resuming somewhere, bringing with it a decisive advantage. We should therefore mention the formidable Chinese and Indian civilizations, which followed the same imperial military logic, if we were not here recounting the history of the victors whose technical superiority eventually led to the military domination of these refined cultures—the harsh reality of hindsight and brute force. It is always possible to lag behind technical progress, as China believed it could do, but sooner or later you will be caught up...
In the Middle Ages, Islam took over and easily seized the remains of the Empire, while in Italy the maritime cities reigned (under the control of the Church, as earthly power was not religious) and Europe was at the mercy of local lords whose first castles were used to plunder the region. The “revolution of 989,” large popular gatherings against the castles, led to the Peace of God and gave the lords a fief to exploit and preserve instead of devastating it—which constituted great material progress but ultimately resulted in the serfdom of the peasantry... The medieval climate optimum that began in 950 ushered in a period of growth, including demographic growth, leading to what Pierre Chaunu called a “full world” in the 13th century. This overpopulation, which was at the root of Christian sexual repression, exposed people to epidemics, notably the terrible Black Death (1347-1352), which killed more than 30% of a population weakened by the onset of the Little Ice Age (beginning in 1303, with the great famine of 1315-1317). At least the resulting labor shortage allowed a whole peasant class to escape serfdom. Nevertheless, this period of reconstruction saw some notable innovations, such as windmills in the 12th century and mechanical clocks in the 14th century, paving the way for mechanization, just as abbeys foreshadowed future factories.
In Italy, the Renaissance was largely the result of wars in which European powers clashed on Italian soil with new firearms. It therefore began shortly before the invention of the printing press (in 1450), which would give it its full scope and enable a return to antiquity, followed by the spread of Protestantism and reading a little later (Luther 1517). The other decisive innovation (1420) was the development of ocean-going ships, such as the caravel, capable of sailing the high seas, which led to the discovery of America (1492), the completion of globalization, and the development of the spice trade and finance—and, ultimately, Western domination over the rest of the world. In terms of production methods, we can cite the proliferation of Dutch windmills in the 16th and 17th centuries, which were initially used to drain the polders but also served as the first machines for processing planks for shipbuilding. While the Greeks invented money, the Italians invented banking (Lombard bankers, the Medici family), which enriched their trading cities (Venice, Florence). The explosion of the arts that followed (Leonardo da Vinci, 1500) was not spontaneous but the result of rivalries between the powers of the time, a kind of soft power comparable to the potlatch, where lavish spending reinforced prestige. As for scientific progress, it came from translations of ancient works, the circulation of books, but also from the ingegneri (including Leonardo) employed in the Italian wars for fortifications and ballistics with the arrival of cannons. This fever for knowledge, which was therefore not so natural, and even less disinterested, led in the following century to the mathematization of physics by Galileo (1604) and then to the rationalist philosophy of the Enlightenment inaugurated by Descartes (1637) before Newton published his Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica in 1687. This time, there are undoubtedly many analogies with the Greek miracle.
The next stage was the beginning of industrialization, which alone is sufficient to explain the revolutions. The English Revolution had taken place in the previous century, but the American Revolution had just drawn up its own constitution in 1787. We often rightly emphasize France's industrial lag behind England at that time, believing that this disqualifies the infrastructure explanation. However, 1788 was the year when France's industrial output (industry, crafts, and services) equaled its agricultural output. It was also the year of a state bankruptcy (debt crash) and, above all, a very poor harvest, even as the population was growing. services) equaled its agricultural output. It was also the year of a state bankruptcy (debt crash) and, above all, a very poor harvest, even though the population had been growing again since 1720. There was therefore no shortage of material causes for the Revolution, which was never a preconceived plan but constantly eluded its participants. Not only was industrialization no stranger to the upheavals underway, but behind the fine words of Rousseau, one of the main reasons that led the impoverished nobility to abolish their privileges was so that they could invest in the nascent industry (the first steam engines were marketed in 1712), which would give rise to a new man, not always pleasant to look at, but when it was not the force of arms that prevailed, it was productive force and financial gain...
The rest is the well-known history of industrial capitalism and all its ravages, which appeared from then on as a savage natural force, an autonomous process that Marx analyzed as a “system of production” in which investment and production are determined by circulation and profit, with cheap goods sufficient to bring down all the walls of China—but in this system, overproduction is paradoxically the most feared, plunging us into misery! Investment in machinery is an important factor in accelerating progress, making the 19th century the scientific century par excellence, but it is work itself that becomes alienating as it becomes mechanized and no longer merely subordinate to a master. The use of fossil fuels, such as coal, which is essential for steam engines, will be a determining factor in growth and technical progress, as will oil later on. From then on, global entropy and the greenhouse effect increased as industry developed and its power became excessive. The most significant aspect of this transition to a new production system was the Civil War, which pitted the industrial North against the agricultural South and demonstrated the superiority of wage labor over slavery, the real reason for the abolition of slavery (1865) rather than moral condemnation. It should be remembered that it was not the slaves who freed themselves (those who revolted were crucified), but the system of production that had changed, with the condition of wage earners not always more enviable than that of slaves, but simply more suited to an industry that now only paid for measurable working time. Wage labor, i.e., individual income, would also become the material basis of individualism (or at least individuation).
The culmination of large-scale industry, which seems to dominate the first half of the 20th century, is industrial wars and mass ideologies that claim to be scientific, opposing versions of Darwinism between liberalism, communism, and racism. The extermination of the Jews will itself be industrial. We are clearly in the midst of a rational delirium that is the backlash of an industrialization that disturbs our being in the world and intoxicates us with its power. It is American liberalism that won the ideological confrontation hands down through its productivity and military hegemony (increasingly based on advanced technology), which is beyond dispute. However, just as the abolition of slavery was due to a change in the system of production and not to the struggles of the slaves, so Fordism and the consumer society were not so much the result of wage struggles as of their positive (Keynesian) effects on growth.
The economy is not always against us, but as always, no matter how good the intentions, only the result counts in the end, and only viable processes that are capable of sustaining themselves will survive. The problem is that this is no longer the case in globalization, where wage increases no longer benefit national production but can instead widen the trade deficit. This is why social protections are under attack, threatening us with a return to the early days of wage exploitation, and why we need to change the model, relocalize the economy, and adapt to new material conditions instead of clinging to obsolete measures and denying globalization based on the current state of technology.
Similarly, with automation, it is not that work could disappear as a means of valuing our skills, but that it is undergoing a profound transformation, changing in meaning and practice, and requiring new mechanisms. A viable system will have to be found with new social protections such as a guaranteed income and institutions for self-employment, which are sorely lacking, but no more than before, the progress of autonomy should be attributed to the demands of workers. Once again, it is a question of productive efficiency. This does not prevent self-employment, provided it is a chosen occupation, from being a factor of emancipation—whereas imposed autonomy can be deeply alienating—but once again, emancipation depends more on material conditions than on our desires.
The end of humanity?
With digital technology and the information age replacing the energy age, we are experiencing a revolution comparable to that of the Neolithic era, disrupting all our lifestyles in a matter of years and transforming us profoundly, with no way of knowing how far this will go. What is certain is that we have already changed a great deal and that we will not be the same in a few years' time. Once the transition is well underway, as in the Neolithic era, the pace of major innovations should slow down, but we are only at the beginning of artificial intelligence, which will continue to amaze us (although it still does not speak our language) and challenge what we thought was unique to humans, forcing us to redefine what makes us human (and what will be valued in relation to robots).
One of the most revolutionary effects of the post-industrial economy is that it deprives patriarchy of its material foundation and provides the means (the pill, washing machines, female wage earners, etc.) for the liberation of women, which is once again the result of changes in the productive infrastructure rather than feminist activism. This is a considerable anthropological revolution that is profoundly transforming us and calling into question all traditional societies. We are still only at the beginning, and the man of the future will undoubtedly be very different from the dominant male of the past.
Neither men nor women are really the actors of history, and it is becoming increasingly clear that technological evolution, which we could share with extraterrestrials, transcends the human species and cannot be stopped. Genetic manipulation seems inevitable in the more or less short term. There will be no end to evolution or eternal life for our genome, but despite the fact that we have no means of universally opposing it, it is likely that transhumanism will not really change the situation, as it will not make us gods, but we will still need the recognition of others and will be just as subject to external factors and selection by results. There will inevitably be regrettable and even very damaging effects, but biotechnologies available to all are far more dangerous, and too underestimated, than our supposed genetic denaturation.
The other massive material factor that will become increasingly important is the ecological threat posed by the Anthropocene, with the disruption of all balances, dangerous global warming, and one of the worst animal extinctions ever, which, far from making us masters of nature, will force us to be its servants. For the time being, pessimism is the order of the day, with the worst-case scenario looming. It is difficult to imagine that the human species itself could become extinct when we are reaching insane population peaks (which favor pandemics, if not bioterrorists). Nevertheless, there is cause for concern and for raising awareness if we do not want to suffer the brutal consequences, which is a more serious issue than the purity of the human race or the threat of being replaced by robots, which are pure fantasies of identity that will not bring back the good old days. The question is not about our changing identity, but about our environment.
There is obviously much more to say. For my part, I have long found it very enlightening to see how economic cycles determine the ideologies of the moment (the parallels between our situation and the aftermath of 1929 are striking, despite all the differences). One could also point to the economic underpinnings of various religious heresies, etc. The point is not to claim to be able to account for all events in detail, but to take stock of everything that can be explained by technical or climatic evolution rather than moral values. Despite all its shortcomings, this overly brief outline is intended simply to highlight the material causes of a history that erases them behind the narrative of individual actions presented as decisive. This may suffice to show that we are neither the cause of knowledge, evolution, nor language, but rather their subjects. What disappears is the image of the triumphant human being that we had formed in our minds. From beginning to end, we see the reign of necessity, where human freedom carries little weight, able to intervene and change the course of events but without significantly altering the major trends and forces at play. Of course, believing that we are free is a necessity for action; it is not a matter of reducing ourselves to passivity and fatalism. My bet is that by recognizing the evolution underway, its constraints and opportunities, and thus engaging in foresight rather than building vain utopias or fighting windmills, we would have a better chance of intervening positively, with real results, albeit necessarily limited...
